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Abstract
Emerging literature explores experimental platform selection games. These games con-
verge rapidly on the superior platform under a wide range of conditions. We replicate the
remarkable results of Hossain and Morgan (2009) in which such a game tips almost perfectly
to the superior platform. Next, we show that platform coordination fails when seemingly
innocent increases in out-of-equilibrium payo¤s are introduced. The inated payo¤s keep
the best reply structure unchanged and do not inuence players security levels. Our de-
sign allows control for the explanatory force of risk dominance. We nd that equilibrium
selection theory is unable to account for coordination failure while observed behavior is con-
sistent with non-rational learning. Furthermore, and contrary to the literature, we nd that
e¢ ciency su¤ers when an inferior platform is granted initial monopoly.
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1. Introduction
Arguably, the most important unresolved question in economic theory is that of equilibrium
selection. Despite the indeterminacy of theory, coordination failures are held responsible for
substantial social costs in a wide range of important applications.1 We focus on coordination
failures in platform selection games.2 These games are characterized by the presence of network
e¤ects and Pareto-ranked equilibria. Protracted investigation by case historians has not produced
agreement about the severity of coordination problems in platform selection games.3
The emerging literature exploring experimental platform selection games (EPSGs) is, how-
ever, more conclusive (Hossain and Morgan 2009, 2011, Hossain et al 2011). Its main nding is
that behavior converges rapidly on the superior (i.e. payo¤ dominant) equilibrium under a wide
range of conditions.4 In particular, granting initial monopoly to an inferior platform does not
a¤ect subsequent coordination on a superior entrant.5 The one exception to the strong e¢ ciency
results in the literature is that conicts between payo¤- and risk dominance seem capable of
pushing behavior away from the superior platform.6
We add to the EPSGs literature in several important ways. First, we show that systematic co-
ordination failures can be generated in platform selection experiments, but that such failures are
not caused by conicts between payo¤- and risk dominance. Second, we nd strong incumbency
(i.e. rst-mover) e¤ects at work. In particular, periods of inferior incumbency signicantly re-
duce subsequent coordination on a superior entrant. Finally, we show that non-rational learning
rules not equilibrium selection theory explain both coordination and coordination failures in
platform selection. Specically, inated out-of-equilibrium payo¤s tend to drive behavior away
from the superior platform through payo¤ reinforcement learning. This happens regardless of
the inated out-of-equilibrium payo¤simpact on risk dominance.
Taken together our ndings qualify the main message of the EPSG-literature; e¢ ciency cannot
be taken for granted in platform selection games, not even when payo¤- and risk dominance
are aligned. Inferior incumbency tends to generate ine¢ ciency, and seemingly innocent payo¤
changes impact forcefully on coordination through behavioral rules.
In EPSGs, positive and negative network e¤ects are at work. There are two types of players
and two platforms. The more players of the opposite type and the fewer of own type that choose
a platform, the more protable that platform choice is. Platform users face a major challenge
in choosing platforms since coordinating on the superior platform requires mutually consistent
beliefs and actions. Such consistency cannot be taken for granted.
1A non exhaustive list of applications where coordination failures are held culpable include: selection of
Condorcet losers in elections (Myerson & Weber 1993, Forsythe et al. 1993); persistency of money illusions (Fehr
& Tyran 2007); bank runs (Diamond & Dybvik 1983, Garratt & Keister 2009); currency attacks (Obstfeld 1996,
Morris & Shin 1998, 1999); setting of industry standards (Farell & Saloner 1985); emergence of at money (Kiotaki
& Wright 1989, Cooper & John 1988); team production (Van Huyck et al. 2008, Brandts & Cooper 2006); and
lack of economic development (Rodrick 1996).
2We take "coordination" to mean play consistent with the payo¤ dominant equilibrium. Coordination "failure",
or "breakdown", is understood as the failure to play the payo¤ dominant equilibrium.
3The prime example is the claim that the QWERTY keyboard is inferior, but still prevalent due to path
dependence (David 1985). The claim that QWERTY is inferior is strongly contested by, among others, Liebowitz
& Margolis (1990, 1994). For a review of the QWERTY history and several other case histories see Farell &
Klemperer (2007) and Gretz (2010).
4These include coexistence of tipping and non-tipping equilibria; as well as vertically and horizontally di¤er-
entiated platforms.
5The main nding from EPSGs contrast with the frequent coordination failures commonly observed in the lab
for other games in which equilibria are Pareto-ranked, notably order statistic games and stag hunt games (see
van Huyck et al. 2008 and Devetag and Ortman 2007 for reviews).
6When criteria conict, market shares of the superior platform hoovers around 50 - 60 percent in Hossain et
al. (2011:Figure 6, N-treatments), compared to rapid convergence to close to 100 percent in all other treatments
of their study.
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To x ideas, consider an island fable (close to the EPSGs we consider). Two sellers and two
buyers (two pairs of player "types") interact. Trading can take place on two di¤erent islands
("platforms"). One island is far away, the other one is close. Players decide simultaneously which
island to trade on. Intuitively, if all players locate on the same island, this is an equilibrium.
A deviant would be located on the other island alone and would get no trade. Since there are
two islands, there are two such equilibria. Travelling to the far o¤ island is more costly, so the
equilibria are Pareto-ranked.
Despite their stylized nature, these games highlight strategic tensions that are present in real
world markets. An illustration is the choice of "green" car technology, should I choose an electrical
platform or a hydrogen based one? The network of complementary services (e.g., lling/charging
stations, repair shops, and secondhand market) is important for consumers. Further, the extent
of a network depends on the number of consumers using the technology. The ip side is that the
protability of investing in a platform depends on the expected size of the network. The risk of
ending up with a small network may prevent the adoption of a technology, even if a widespread
change to that technology is preferred.
An issue of particular relevance for the problems considered in this paper is that the level of
both producer and consumer rents may depend on the technology of the platform. Consider a
situation in which the xed costs of a hydrogen lling station (vehicle) are higher than those of
the electrical alternative. Now, holding all else equal, monopoly (monopsony) rents will be higher
on the electric platform. Importantly, however, high rents are an out-of-equilibrium phenomenon
in platform selection games.
In the remainder of the paper, we explore the robustness of EPSG e¢ ciency. First, we present
a design that permits replication, facilitates a controlled test of equilibrium selection theory, and
allows for the exploration of incumbency advantages. Second, in the results section, we replicate
the remarkable coordination result of Hossain and Morgan (2009) (hereafter HM). We then show
that coordination is wiped out when out-of-equilibrium payo¤s are manipulated in seemingly
innocent ways. Subsequently, we demonstrate that incumbency e¤ects are present and that non-
rational learning rules, not the theory of equilibrium selection, explains our data. The paper
ends with a brief conclusion.
2. Design
The centre piece of our design is a controlled ination of out-of-equilibrium payo¤s (i.e. provision
of high rents) in each of the two original payo¤ matrices used by HM. This leaves us with two
pairs of matrices, each pair consisting of an original and an inated matrix. In each pair we inate
in a way that preserves the best reply structure and security levels of the original matrix. Thus,
the inated out-of-equilibrium payo¤s should not lead to coordination breakdown according
to standard theory.7 In the rst pair of matrices (1/1*) the superior platform remains risk
dominant after ination. In the second pair of matrices (2/2*) the superior platform becomes
risk dominated after ination. According to the theory of equilibrium selection, coordination
should not fail in the inated matrix of the rst pair, while it may fail in the second.
Our experiment consists of 6 sessions. A session consists of 3 consecutive sets, and each
set consists of 15 periods. In the rst 5 periods of a set, subjects are constrained to choose a
monopoly platform ("the incumbent"). In the last 10 periods of a set, subjects are free to choose
between the incumbent and an alternative platform ("the entrant"). Thus, a session has a total
of 45 periods. Unique subjects were used in di¤erent sessions, and markets of 4 subjects were
7By standard theory we understand maximizing behavior from pure self-regard and common knowledge ratio-
nality. We make a distinction between standard theory and (the more general) theory of equilibrium selection.
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randomly formed at the beginning of each set from a total of either 16 or 20 subjects. The
probability of identical markets forming in di¤erent sets of a session was marginal.
At the start of a session, subjects were randomly assigned one of two types. Types were kept
throughout the session. There were two pairs of opposite types in each market.
The matrices and the incumbents were varied systematically over the sets in a session. We
utilized four matrices (Table 1). In the matrices, numbers provide the payo¤s of player i from her
own platform choice, conditioned on the platform choices of opposite and identical player types.
Numbers are player is payo¤s from choosing a platform (A, B). Access costs of platforms (A, B)
are provided below each matrix. Matrices 1 and 2 are identical to the ones used in HM. Matrices
1* and 2* di¤er only by the inated out-of-equilibrium payo¤ in square brackets. Matrices 2 and
2* are identical to the ones used in Hossain et al. (2011).8
Table 1: Payo¤ matrices for player i
Matrices 1 [1*] # of players of same type
choosing same platform as me
0 1
# of players of 0 3 6 3 6
opposite type choosing 1 9 10 6 7
same platform as me 2 12 13[24] 11 12
My platform choice: A B A B
Access fees (A=2;B=5)
Matrices 2 [2*] # of players of same type
choosing same platform as me
0 1
# of players of 0 4 4 4 4
opposite type choosing 1 8 11 6 8
same platform as me 2 11[22] 13 10 12
My platform choice: A B A B
Access fees (A=2;B=3)
In each of the four matrices in Table 1 there are three equilibria in pure strategies: i) all four
players choose platform A, ii) all four players choose platform B, and iii) pairs of opposite player
types choose opposite platforms. We refer to the equilibria in i) and ii) as "tipping," while the
equilibrium in iii) is referred to as "non-tipping."
In matrices 1 and 1* platform A is the superior platform. In matrices 2 and 2* platform B
is the superior platform. The tipping equilibria payo¤ dominates the non-tipping equilibrium in
all matrices.
Harsanyi and Selten (1988) (hereafter HS) is the seminal contribution in equilibrium selection
theory.9 ;10The HS theory has a rm micro foundation (a set of axioms) for 22 games only. If
8Matrix 2* is the one underlying Hossain et al. (2011: Figure 6, N-treatments).
9A number of papers analyze selection in sequential games (see e.g., Ochs and Park 2010; Heal and Kunreuther
2010), where early movers may induce others to follow, inducing the market to tip to an equilibrium (which is said
to be selected). The focus in this paper is selection in nitely repeated stage games, where stage-game actions
are taken simultaneously.
10Equilibrium selection theories apply to stationary environments. In the experiment, the stage game is repeated
a nite and known number of times in a partner matching. Given that a theory of equilibrium selection provides
a clear recommendation for the one-shot game, nite repetition should not challenge this recommendation (by
backward induction). Thus, it makes sense to apply stationary theories of equilibrium selection in the experiment.
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an equilibrium is both payo¤ dominant and risk dominant, selection criteria do not conict, and
the equilibrium should be selected. In n-person games, equilibrium selection is a contested issue,
and several competing denitions of risk dominance exist (see Carlsson and van Damme 1993
for a discussion).11 For n-person games, HS advocate the use of a tracing procedure, assuming
correlated beliefs.12 In what follows we use the HS denition of risk dominance.
Using the HS tracing procedure with correlated beliefs we nd that the superior platform risk
dominates the inferior platform in matrices 1,1*, and 2, while the inferior platform risk dominates
the superior platform in matrix 2*. The non-tipping equilibria are always risk dominated. Hence,
from equilibrium selection theory one should not expect coordination failure in matrices 1, 1*
or 2, since there is no conict between selection criteria. In matrix 2*, selection criteria are not
aligned, and coordination may fail. If the pattern of actual behavior is to coordinate on the
superior platform in matrices 1, 2, and 1* but not in matrix 2*, equilibrium selection theory
provides a consistent story.
Note that there is also an equilibrium in mixed strategies in each of the four matrices. In
this equilibrium, all players randomize with identical distributions over platforms A and B.
In going from matrix 1 (2) to matrix 1* (2*), the probability weight on platform A (B) in
the mixed-strategy equilibrium is increased. Thus, our inated out-of-equilibrium payo¤s make
coordination on the superior platform more likely, given that the mixed-strategy equilibrium
is being played.13 The mixed-strategy equilibrium is payo¤ dominated by all pure strategy
equilibria in the original matrices (1 and 2). In the inated matrices (1* and 2*), the two tipping
equilibria continue to payo¤ dominate the mixed-strategy equilibrium. However, for one pair of
opposite players (but not for the other pair) the mixed strategy equilibrium payo¤-dominates
the non-tipping equilibrium in the inated matrices.14 This should, if anything, make play of
the mixed-strategy equilibrium more attractive in the inated matrices.
Finally, note that the security levels (i.e., maximin) are una¤ected by the ination. Therefore,
payo¤distances between security levels and equilibria are also kept constant. This payo¤distance
constitutes an alternative conception of the "riskiness" of an equilibrium; see Van Huyck et al.
(1991).
To sum up, inating the payo¤s does not impact on pure strategy equilibria or security levels,
and it changes the mixed strategy equilibrium in a direction indicating more e¢ cient coordination
if the mix is played. According to equilibrium selection theory, coordination should not break
down in matrices 1, 1* and 2, while it may well break down in matrix 2*.
The six sessions of our experiment are described in Table 2. Sessions I, II, and III replicate
HM, while sessions I*, II*, and III* extend HM.15
11For example Güth (1992) develops theory that provides an extension of the HS theory to the n-person case,
while Peski (2010) develops a concept of "generalized risk dominance".
12Combining correlated beliefs with the tracing procedure can lead to counter intuitive results (see Güth 2002
for examples).
13The probability of player i choosing (the superior) platform A is 0.374 in matrix 1, and 0.491 in matrix 1*.
The probability of player i choosing (the inferior) platform A is 0.561 in matrix 2, and 0.458 in matrix 2*.
14The expected gain (net of access fees) from playing the mixed-strategy equilibrium for player i is 4.49 (5.31)
in matrix 1 (1*), and 5.45 (6.15) in matrix 2 (2*).
15HM ran an additional treatment to check for ordering e¤ects. We do not perform such checks since HM found
no e¤ects of ordering.
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Table 2: Sessions (Matrix; Incumbent)
Set 1 Set 2 Set 3 N Date
Session I (1; B) (2; A) (1; B) 16 9 November 2011
Session I* (1*; B) (2*; A) (1*; B) 20 9 November 2011
Session II (2; A) (1; B) (2; A) 16 24 January 2012
Session II* (2*; A) (1*; B) (2*; A) 20 25 January 2012
Session III (1; A) (2; A) (1; A) 16 10 November 2011
Session III* (1*; A) (2*; A) (1*; A) 20 10 November 2011
As can be seen, in sessions I and I* the incumbent is always inferior; this is also the case in
sessions II and II* (which simply run I and I* in reversed order), while in sessions III and III*
the incumbent is always cheap.
To facilitate replication, the original z-tree program les16 and the original instructions from
HM were used in sessions I, II, and III. Files and instructions were modied only: i) to account
for the changed matrices in sessions I*, II*, and III*, and ii) to account for the new exchange
rate of experimental points (from points to Norwegian kroner (NOK) rather than to Hong Kong
dollars).
A total of 108 subjects were recruited by e-mail from the pool of BA students at BI Norwegian
Business School. Subjects were used for a maximum of 90 minutes at expected earnings of
approximately 200 NOK. Actual sessions lasted on average 75 minutes, with average earnings
of 196 NOK (which is slightly above the hourly rate for research assistants at the institution).
At the end of the experiment, points earned were converted at a rate of 0.6 NOK per point.
Subjects were paid their earnings privately in NOK on exit.
All sessions were executed in the research lab of BI Norwegian Business School. On arrival,
subjects drew a ticket with a number corresponding to their cubicle in the lab (in order to break
up social groups). Once seated, instructions were read aloud to achieve public knowledge about
the rules of the game, payo¤s, and exchange rates. Subsequently, the session was conducted
with a strict no-communication rule enforced. All interactions were performed through the PC
network and anonymity was preserved throughout the experiment.
3. Results
Figure 1 shows results from three sets based on matrices 1/1*, in which the incumbent is expensive
and inferior (sets 1 and 3: sessions I/I*; set 2: sessions II/II*). The y-axis measures the average
percentage of subjects choosing the superior platform (i.e., the market share of the superior
platform). The solid line shows behavior with original payo¤s (from HM), while the stapled line
shows behavior with inated payo¤s.
16Fischbacher (2007).
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The solid line in Figure 1 tightly tracks the result in HM.17 After some initial problems,
markets coordinate on the superior platform. The coordination is not perfect, but after period
8, the market share of the superior platform stays above 80 % (excluding the monopoly phases
where the inferior platform was the only choice). However, the result changes dramatically when
the inated payo¤ is introduced. The dotted line shows that the markets fail to coordinate. In
fact, the market share of the superior platform is less than 30 % for the last 10 periods. This
is certainly surprising, since in this case no clear mechanism exist by which the inated out-of-
equilibrium payo¤s should inuence equilibrium selection (for both inated and original matrices
the superior platform is risk dominant).
Figure 2 shows results from three sets based on matrices 2/2*, in which the incumbent is
cheap and inferior (sets 1 and 3: sessions II/II*; set 2: sessions III/III*). As before, the market
share of the superior platform is measured on the y-axis. Again, the solid line shows behavior
with original payo¤s, while the stapled line shows it with inated payo¤s.
17See HM Figure 1.
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Once more, the solid line in Figure 2 reproduces the result in HM.18 Coordination on the
superior platform breaks down once the inated payo¤ is introduced. In this case the superior
platform is not risk dominant, and this could in principle explain breakdown.
Taken together, Figures 1 and 2 show that coordination is fragile. A change in an out-of-
equilibrium payo¤ that is inconsequential according to standard theory destroys market coor-
dination, and coordination breaks down whether the change impacts risk dominance or not.19
Also, the incumbent platform may retain a substantial market share even if the entrant platform
is superior.
Table 3 displays average market share for the superior platform per market in set 3 ("share"),
and displays the average share of markets that were coordinated on the superior platform in set
3 ("coord"). The monopoly phase (periods 3135) was excluded prior to calculating the averages
in Table 3. Data are broken down on sessions and on original versus inated payo¤s. We use
these data to perform Mann-Whitney U-tests (two-sample ranksum tests). Markets are selected
as observational units since strategic interaction takes place within, but presumably (given our
matching protocol and information partition) not across markets. Thus, market-level data should
be independent. The nal set is selected based on the assumption that behavior has had time to
settle down.
18See HM Figure 2.
19Güths denition returns the same results as the HS procedure for matrices 1, 1*. For matrices 2 and 2* the
superior and inferior equilibria are risk neutral. With Peskis denition, the superior platform risk dominates in
the original matrices, while this method is silent with respect to risk dominance for the inated matrices. In sum
neither Güths nor Peskis denitions account better for observed behavior than the HS theory.
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Table 3: Set 3, per market data
Session I Session II Session III
Market share coord share coord share coord
1 0.975 .900 1.000 1.000 .975 .900
2 0.825 .300 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
3 0.975 .900 0.900 0.700 1.000 1.000
4 0.950 .800 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Session I* Session II* Session III*
Market share coord share coord share coord
1 0.400 0.000 0.100 0.000 0.775 0.300
2 0.175 0.000 0.100 0.000 0.525 0.200
3 0.150 0.000 0.700 0.200 0.400 0.000
4 0.400 0.000 0.150 0.000 0.525 0.200
5 0.050 0.000 0.575 0.000 0.325 0.000
First, we test the di¤erences in the market shares of the superior platform between the original
and the inated treatments. The distributions in the two treatments di¤er signicantly in all
sessions (Session I vs I* p = 0.014; Session II vs II* p = 0.012; Session III vs III* p = 0.012).
So far, we have discussed market shares of the superior platform as a measure of coordination.
Alternatively we may look at the average share of markets that were coordinated on the superior
platform. From Table 3, we see that coordination on the superior platform rarely occurs in the
inated treatments. In fact, there were no instances of such coordination at all in Session I*.
Second, we test whether costs of the platforms matter for the market share of the superior
platform. We test the di¤erences of distributions in Sessions I vs II (incumbent is inferior and
expensive vs inferior and cheap). We nd no signicant di¤erences in these tests (Session I vs
II p = 0.137). Hence, our data support the same result on costs as HMs data: costs of the
platforms do not seem to matter for coordination.
Third, we test whether equilibrium selection theory can account for variation in the degree
of coordination failure. Comparing di¤erences in distributions in Sessions I* vs II* and II* vs
III* (aligned vs non-aligned selection criteria) we nd no signicant di¤erences (Session I* vs
II* p=0.833; Session II* vs III* p=0.344), indicating that selection theory does not account for
variation in coordination failure.
Fourth, we investigate whether an initial monopoly for the inferior platform matters for the
market share of the superior platform. We test the di¤erences in distributions in Session I vs III
and I* vs III* (superior vs inferior incumbent). In both cases, there are signicant di¤erences
(Session I vs III p = 0.034; Session I* vs III* p = 0.044). Since the incumbent platform is
di¤erent in Sessions I and III across both the cost and the Pareto dimensions, we cannot directly
determine what drives these di¤erences. However, above we indicated that costs do not seem to
matter. Thus, initial monopoly seems to impact on coordination.
In sum: coordination breaks down when out-of-equilibrium payo¤s are inated. Standard
theory does not seem to explain this breakdown, nor does the theory of equilibrium selection.
What about non-rational learning theories that take into account the history dependence of play
envisaged in our gures?20 To explore this possibility, we test for the e¤ect of ctitious play
20The observed history dependence of play makes non-rational stationary theories such as Quantal Response
Equilibrium (McKelvey and Palfrey 1995) and other stationary concepts (such as those investigated in Selten
and Chmura 2008)  less suited for our purposes. The constancy over time problem in both labeling symmetries
(Schelling 1960), and payo¤ asymmetries (Crawford et al. 2008; Goeree and Holt 2001) in our games, also makes
coordination by focal points insu¢ cient for explaining our data.
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(Brown 1951; Fudenberg and Levine 1998) and of simple payo¤ reinforcement learning (Roth
and Erev 1995; Erev and Roth 1998) on the probability of making Pareto optimal choices.21
Before we run regressions trying to explain the dynamics of play, we address variations in
initial behavior. From Figures 1 and 2, we see that for matrices 1, 1*, and 2 the initial market
share of the superior platform is 60-65%, while it is only 45% for matrix 2*. A similar gap is
present in the full data set underlying the regressions presented below.22 We approach this gap
in the usual way, by formulating a level-k model (see for instance Crawford et al. 2012).23
A level-0 player ips a coin to determine which platform to choose. If a player believes her
opponents to be level-0 players, her best response is to choose the superior platform in matrices
1, 1*, and 2, while the inferior platform is her best response in matrix 2*.24 Accordingly, the
best reply for a level-1 player to level-0 opponents is to choose the superior platform, unless she
is playing matrix 2*, for which her best reply is the inferior platform. It is easily seen that for
all k  2, a level-k players optimal response to opponents with level k   1 is identical to her
optimal response in the k = 1 case.
We conclude that the initial choices are consistent with a simple level-k model: the initial
market share of the superior platform is well above 50% in matrices 1, 1*, and 2, while it is well
below 50% in matrix 2*. We now address the dynamics of play.
The logistical regressions in Table 4 include only periods where subjects had a choice (i.e.,
the rst 5 periods in each set have been deleted, and periods are re-numbered from 1 to 30).
Our dependent variable is a dummy coded 1 if the subject chose the superior platform, and
0 otherwise. We regress this dummy on six explanatory variables. The variable reinforcement
lies in the interval (0; 1), and maps a subjects probability of choosing the superior platform
from that subjects historical success when making this choice.25 By construction, this choice
probability increases (decreases) at a diminishing rate with past payo¤ success in choosing the
superior (inferior) platform.26 The ctitious play variable is a dummy coded 1 (0) if choosing
the superior (inferior) platform in a given period maximizes individual expected payo¤s for that
period, given beliefs corresponding to the historical frequency of choices made by the three other
players in the group. Our regressions include a dummy for lagged choice of the superior platform
(to capture habitual behavior); a trend variable (periods); as well as a dummy taking the value
1 if matrix 2/2* is used and 0 otherwise, and lastly a dummy taking the value 1 for inferior
incumbent platform and 0 otherwise.
We run a split sample analysis for original matrices (1 and 2) and inated matrices (1* and
2*) in order to capture the interaction between out-of-equilibrium payo¤s and other explanatory
variables. The regressions in the rst two columns of Table 4 have xed e¤ects for groups, while
the two last regressions are without xed group e¤ects. The xed e¤ects estimator has the
best a priori justication, since the dynamics modeled (reinforcement and ctitious play) should
be expected to vary systematically over groups within a set. However, the specication without
21We work with the pure forms of learning (belief and reinforcement) rather than with the (heavily) parame-
terized version of Camerer and Ho (1999), which is also able to produce in-between forms of learning. In simple,
normal form experiments, reinforcement learning seems able to explain most of the behavioral dynamics.
22First-period mean market share of the superior platform in the full data set is 0.75 (N = 32) for matrix 1;
0.55 (N = 40) for matrix 1*; 0.69 (N = 20) for matrix 2; and 0.45 (N = 20) for matrix 2*.
23Hossain and Morgan (2011) point to some interesting relationships, in platform competition games, between
level-k thinking and the risk dominance concept of the HS theory.
24These choices follow directly from the mixed-strategy equilibrium described in note 13.
25Payo¤s are reinforced by their (net) payo¤ deviations relative to the (net) minimum payo¤ of the relevant
matrix, which happens to be 1 for all matrices.
26We use equal initial weights on the two choices (Pareto optimal platform and non-Pareto optimal platform),
making platform choices random in the rst period. The "strength of attraction" is set to the numeric value
10 (see Roth and Erev 1995; Erev and Roth 1998 for details). The choice probability is fairly insensitive to the
numerical value of the strength of attraction.
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group xed e¤ects allows for incumbent features that are constant within, but not across, groups.
Skipping xed group e¤ects therefore allows us to make use of data for the ten groups in which
subjects chose the superior platform in all periods of a session.
In calculating the (history-dependent) reinforcement and ctitious play variables we assume
that subject learning in one matrix (1 and 1*, respectively) is fully relevant for behavior in the
other matrix (2 and 2*, respectively).27 To check for the soundness of this assumption in data,
we ran specications including dummies for sets (not reported). Main results are una¤ected by
such controls, indicating that robust cross-matrix learning is taking place.28
Table 4: Logistical regressions. Dependent: Choice of optimal platform (standard errors).
Originaly Inatedy Originalz Inatedz
Reinforcement 8.79 *** 1.83 *** 8.47 *** 1.78 ***
(1.48) (0.49) (1.04) (0.43)
Fictitious play -0.31 ** 0.13
(0.15) (0.13)
Superior choicet 1 0.32 0.80 *** 1.09 *** 1.17 ***
(0.26) (0.12) (0.25) (0.11)
Period 0.12 ** 0.03 -0.01 0.00
(0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01)
Matrix 2/2* 0.03 -0.19
(0.22) (0.12)
Inferior incumbent -0.61 * -0.45 ***
(0.32) (0.14)
Constant -3.73 *** -1.48 ***
(0.64) (0.29)
# Groups 36 45 36 45
# Groups used 26 45 36 45
# Observations 1440 1800 1440 1800
# Observations used 996 1740 1392 1740
Log Likelihood -241.08 *** -887.78 *** -335.56 *** -1052.61 ***
Legend: yFixed group e¤ects; zNo xed e¤ects; Signicant at: *** 1% level; ** 5% level; * 10% level
Note rst that ctitious play is a constant with original matrices. In this case, the ctitious
dummy favors choosing the superior platform in the initial period. Choice of the superior platform
is also frequent enough to ensure that the dummy keeps the value 1 in all subsequent periods, and
for all subjects. In the treatment with inated matrices, the ctitious play dummy varies over
time and subjects. Fictitious play has a marginal e¤ect on the choice of platform, is contrary to
expectations in the xed-e¤ects specication, and insignicant without xed e¤ects. There is a
positive e¤ect of habit on platform choice for inated matrices. For original matrices this e¤ect
is not robust to econometric specication. There is no robust time trend in the data after control
for learning dynamics. As in the aggregate analysis, there is no signicant e¤ect attributable to
equilibrium selection theory. That is, the e¤ect of the dummy for matrix 2/2* is insignicant
27Experimental evidence indicates that learning takes place even over fairly dissimilar games (see Cooper and
Kagel 2008, and the general discussion in Samuelson 2005).
28We also ran a series of other specications, including linear probability models, with and without xed and
random group e¤ects, and logistical regressions with random group e¤ects. Our results are remarkably robust to
these alternative specications.
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for both original matrices (aligned vs aligned selection criteria) and inated matrices (aligned vs
non-aligned selection criteria).
Choosing the superior platform is less likely if the incumbent platform is inferior. This nding
is fairly robust even when regressions are restricted to the last few periods of the experiment,
indicating persistency in the incumbency e¤ect.29 However, the incumbency e¤ect is less certain
for original matrices. Returning to the estimates in Table 4, with other independent variables at
their mean, moving from a superior to an inferior incumbent reduces the probability of choosing
the superior platform by 11 percentage points in the inated matrices. The corresponding number
for original matrices is a 9-percentage-point reduction.
The e¤ect of reinforcement is highly robust over specications, and reinforcement of the
superior platform choice is stronger in the original than in the inated matrices. The e¤ect of
reinforcement on coordination is substantial. Keeping other independent variables at their mean,
while letting reinforcement go from 0 to 1, increases the probability of choosing the superior
platform by 96 percentage points for the original matrices, and by 41 percentage points for the
inated matrices. In sum: simple payo¤ reinforcement of the superior platform choice leads to
coordination with original matrices and to coordination failure with inated matrices.
Lastly, we ask to what extent behavior is consistent with some equilibrium for the di¤erent
matrices. Again, we focus attention on the last set. Figure 3 displays the average fraction of
markets playing each of the three pure strategy equilibria, conditioned on matrices.
As seen above, markets facing original matrices coordinate almost perfectly on the superior
platform (on average 93 - 98 percent). When these markets fail to coordinate, they are invariably
out of equilibrium. In markets facing inated matrices, play is rarely consistent with any of the
pure strategy equilibria. When play is in equilibrium, it usually means coordination on the
superior platform. The two inferior equilibria are rarely, if ever, played. In sum: when markets
fail to coordinate on the superior platform, they fail to be in equilibrium at all.30 ;31
29Running the regressions in columns two and three of Table 4, but restricting observations to the last 10
periods in set 3, or the last 5 periods in sets 1 and 3, does not change results qualitatively. A joint test with
inated and original matrices in the same regression, and restricting observations to the last 5 periods of set 3,
returns a signicant coe¢ cient on inferior incumbency. Results are available from authors upon request.
30One may wonder if out-of-equilibrium behavior stabilizes in the inated matrices. This, however, does not
seem to be the case. With inated matrices the frequency of subjects changing decisions from one period to the
next is 27 percent in the nal set, compared to only 4 percent with original matrices.
31The coordination failures we observe are not "QWERTY" outcomes; behavior does not stabilize on an inferior
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4. Conclusion
An emerging literature nds remarkable e¢ ciency in EPSGs under a broad set of conditions. In
particular, inferior incumbency does not reduce the market share of the superior challenger, and
coordination does not fail if the superior platform is also risk dominant.
We question the generality of these ndings. For some payo¤ matrices EPSGs coordinate
superbly, for other matrices coordination fails miserably. Equilibrium selection theory does not
account for observed failures. When coordination fails, it fails regardless of whether the superior
platform is risk dominant or not. In addition, incumbency e¤ects are present regardless of
whether markets coordinate or fail. Thus, path dependence impacts signicantly on market
e¢ ciency.
We show that observed behavior is consistent with initial level-k reasoning and subsequent
payo¤ reinforcement learning. Interpreting inated payo¤s as high rents our results suggest that
EPSGs coordinate well in the absence of high rents, and lousily in their presence. This holds
despite of high rents being an out-of-equilibrium payo¤ in these games.
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